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Advocacy
A regional conference, “Progress towards the Ottawa Convention’s Aims in
Central Asia,” was held 15–16 April 2004, in
Dushanbe. The conference was organized by
the UNDP with the support of the Geneva
International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining. Official representatives of central Asian countries and Afghanistan, the
UNDP, the OCSE, the GICHD, the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the ICRC,
representatives of diplomatic corps and international organizations registered in Tajikistan,
governmental authorities and NGO representatives took part in the conference. Participants
discussed the implementation process of the
Ottawa Convention in the region on the eve
of the First Review Conference in Nairobi,
Kenya. The conference adopted a statement
that stressed the necessity of support for the
process of the Ottawa Convention and the
need for the central Asian countries to accede to the Convention. It pleased officials
that Her Majesty Queen Noor of Jordan
took part in the conference.

The official delegation of the Republic
of Tajikistan took part in the First Review
Conference in Nairobi and made a presentation about the process of implementing the
Ottawa Convention. TMAC and other governmental representatives continue to take an
active role in international conferences and
meetings on the banning of anti-personnel
mines. TMAC conducts ongoing training, meetings, liaison and other activities as
part of the process of implementation of the
Tajikistan Mine Action Programme.
Reporting
In accordance with Article 7 of the
Ottawa Convention, the Republic of
Tajikistan submits its annual reports to the
U.N. Secretary-General on the country’s minecontamination status and on the completion
process to comply with the Convention.  
Conclusion
The Civil War of the 1990s created a
mine/UXO problem for Tajikistan that is
still threatening the daily lives of its citizens a decade later. The Tajikistan Mine
Action Centre is remedying the devastating
effects this problem has had on the country. TMAC, with international support,
has started and will continue to make huge
strides in mine/UXO clearance, mine-risk
education and victim assistance.
See Endnotes, page 112

Armed Non-state Actors: The Main Users of the

“Poor Man’s Weapon”
This report, which builds on the 2004 Geneva
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TMAC, in cooperation with the
MLSPP, ICRC, UNDP, and RCS, organized a summer camp for 32 mine survivors
in Romit valley of the Vahdat district in
July 2005. The camp provided the survivors an opportunity for psychological rehabilitation and social integration.

Call initial analysis,1 provides a comprehensive
mapping of the use, acquisition, production,
transfer and stockpiling of landmines by armed
non-state actors through a presentation of
individual group profiles and a global analysis.
The report records global occurrences of antipersonnel and anti-vehicle mine planting by
NSAs during 2003–2005, whether activated
by victims, vehicles or at a distance using
Sudan People’s Liberation Army combatant in South Sudan.

by Anki Sjöberg [ Geneva Call ]

N

Rigged Mine Blast Kills 64, Injures More
A powerful landmine blast ripped through a passenger bus loaded with commuters and schoolchildren in
northern Sri Lanka in early June. The attack, attributed to the terrorist group Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (popularly known as the Tamil Tigers), killed more than 64 people and injured dozens more.
Officials said many of the injured were bystanders not on the bus.
The explosion tore through the packed bus in a crowded part of Kabithigollewa, a town about 200
kilometers (125 miles) north of the capital, Colombo. Military officials said the blast came from two
landmines hanging from a tree and rigged to detonate when signaled from a remote position. Rigging mines
above ground on trees and other structures is a common Tiger tactic to reduce blast shielding provided
by the ground. The Tigers strongly denied responsibility for the attack after government officials
assigned blame to the group. The bus bombing was the most violent act since a tentative ceasefire in
2002 and brings the divided country even closer to total war.
The Sri Lankan Air Force responded later by bombing several rebel-held areas in other parts of the
country. The Tigers are a separatist terrorist group seeking independence of certain areas from Sri
Lanka and have been classified as a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S. Department of State.

72 | notes from the field | journal of mine action | 2006 | august | 10.1

command detonation.

on-state actors often have more limited military resources
than the states against which they fight and, therefore, use
landmines, “the poor man’s weapon,” more frequently. As
a consequence, the number of NSAs using landmines significantly
exceeds the number of states deploying this weapon.
Around 60 NSAs have emplaced landmines in 24 countries across
five geographic regions: sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin
America and the Middle East/North Africa.2 In addition to these
NSAs, armed groups, which are difficult to identify as belonging to
a certain category of ideology or organizational form, have also made
frequent use of landmines in a few other countries. Two-thirds of
these groups have deployed some type of victim-activated devices.
These devices were both factory-made and handmade, indicating
NSA involvement in both the transfer and the production of mines.
Armed Non-State Actors and Landmines. Volume I: A Global Report
Profiling NSAs and their Use, Acquisition, Production, Transfer and
Stockpiling of Landmines2 confirmed earlier findings of important regional disparities, not the least of which was the comparatively higher
concentration of mine use by NSAs in Asia, especially of improvised
explosive devices (aka handmade mines).3 The second most affected
region is Africa.
A greater proportion of NSA mine use occurs in Ottawa
Convention4 non-signatory countries: 60 percent of the NSAs identified as mine users operate in these countries.2 Given that 151 of the
world’s approximately 200 states have adhered to this international
agreement, it appears that non-signatories are more exposed to NSA
mine use than are States Parties. This is not to say, however, that

being a party to the Ottawa Convention protects a country from NSA
mine deployment. Indeed, two very frequent mine users, the Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia and the Ejército de Liberación
Nacional, operate in Colombia, a State Party.
Frequency of Mine Use
Keeping in mind the differences in mine use among NSAs is
crucial in choosing the most appropriate strategy for engaging them
in a mine ban. It is clear there are significant disparities between
NSAs, not only in terms of the reasons that motivate their mine use
and the types of mines they choose to employ, but also in respect
to the frequency of use.5 For some NSAs, landmines constitute one
of their weapons of choice. Examples of such groups include FARC
and ELN in Colombia, several Burmese and Kashmiri groups, and
the Communist Party of Nepal–Maoist. Other groups deploy mines
when they have access to, or a particular “need” for, mines. Instances
of this are the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda, the Abu Sayyaf
Group in the Philippines and the Rahanwein Resistance Army in
Somalia. Some groups, such as the Party for the Liberation of the
Hutu People–National Liberation Forces in Burundi and the Sendero
Luminoso in Peru, are sporadic users.
Logic Behind NSA Mine Use
Although deemed by many as lacking decisive military utility
and despite their disastrous humanitarian consequences, landmines
clearly serve different purposes for each NSA that employs them.1
Knowing why and how NSAs use these weapons could contribute to
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developing a successful strategy for engaging these groups in the landmine ban. Four
reasons for mine use were identified as the
purpose of the report:
1. Offensive
2. Defensive
3. Economic gain
4. So-called “nuisance mining”
Many NSAs use landmines in an offensive manner; for example, the CPN-M
in Nepal, the Kurdistan People’s Congress/
Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan (Kongra-Gel/
PKK) in Turkey, the Communist Party of
India–Maoist in India, and the Taliban
in Afghanistan. However, offensive use is
probably significantly over-reported since it
is more visible.
NSAs often confirm not only offensive
but also defensive mine uses. Indeed, according to a majority of NSAs, landmines
are mainly utilized for defensive purposes. The Burmese Rohingya Solidarity
Organization has admitted to using mines
to defend its camps and bases as well as to
protect its members from robbery or from
the Bangladeshi Army. The Chin National
Front (Burma/Myanmar) has also admitted
to using mines for self-defense, apparently
to protect its camps.
Landmine use for economic purposes
is not frequently reported, although this is
probably due to underreporting rather than
the insignificance of this kind of use. For
example, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
de Colombia allegedly utilizes landmines for
the protection of coca plantations, whereas
the Movement of the Democratic Forces of
Casamance in Senegal is thought to plant
landmines to hinder the local population
from benefiting from economically profitable land.
As for nuisance mining, the most cited example is probably that of the Lord’s
Resistance Army. Nuisance mining is the
use of mines that serve no direct military
or economic purpose. This includes using
mines to interfere with strategic infrastructure, such as communications and railways,
or to affect civilians. Other examples are
groups in Colombia and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. FARC allegedly
placed mines at the entrances of a town and
in houses and vehicles before the army took
over the area.3
Command-detonation
NSAs frequently use landmines offensively, targeting state security forces or other
individuals linked to the state. In many cases, NSAs are present at the time and place
of the landmine attacks. This suggests that
for these NSAs, command-detonated land-

mines may be an alternative, and hence, a
total ban on AP mines may be possible.  
There is currently a trend in many
conflicts towards increased use of commanddetonated mines. However, although
command-detonation is clearly preferable
from a humanitarian point of view to victim and vehicle activation, this does not
constitute a guarantee that civilians and
humanitarian actors will not be victimized,
as became evident in the tragic incident in
Nepal’s Chitwan district in June 2005.6
Widespread Production and Use
of IEDs
Around 40 groups globally produced
and used improvised explosive devices between 2003 and 2005.2 This indicates that a
strategy that solely targets access to factorymade landmines and explosives is not sufficient. Easy access to materials necessary to
manufacture IEDs, as well as knowledge and
technology transfers among NSAs, has un-

state sponsors are thought to supply NSAs
with factory-made mines.
Large areas of the world are not under the
effective control of any state, a fact facilitating
the trafficking of arms and IED-making material among NSAs. Nevertheless, it should
be noted that in some post-conflict situations
there is no need for NSAs or individuals to
look for sources of mines since weapons, including mines, are plentiful and easily available, as in Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia.
Different NSAs have allegedly transferred
to each other not only arms and explosives
but also the knowledge and technology on
how to manufacture landmines, as in Burma/
Myanmar, India and the Philippines. There
are also allegations that some transfers are of
a more permanent character and include the
joint running of camps. Indeed, it has been
asserted on more than one occasion that
there have been intense contacts between the
Nepalese CPN-M and some Indian Maoists
(CPI–M), including joint training.7

“There is currently a trend
in many conflicts towards
increased use of commanddetonated mines.”

doubtedly contributed to spreading the landmine problem. Nevertheless, IEDs do not
always constitute indiscriminate weapons as
this depends on how they are put to use.
Sources of Factory-made Mines
Factory-made landmines are accessible to
NSAs through at least three sources:
1. Minefields or stocks
2. Certain state sponsors
3. Other NSAs or the black market
One of the main sources of factory-made
landmines for NSAs is the very state against
which they are fighting. Incidents of NSAs
managing to loot or capture landmines from
the state are reported regularly. Such has repeatedly been the case in the Philippines and
Burma/Myanmar. NSAs have also reported
that soldiers from state armies have offered
to sell them landmines. Furthermore, foreign
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Impact of NSA Mine Use
The impact of NSA mine use is in many
respects similar to the impact of state mine
use. However, it appears that NSA mines
are more widely dispersed than state mines
and non-state actors are usually less prone to
mark or map their mines.
The humanitarian impact of NSA mine
use is difficult to measure, since it takes
place in a conflict situation, in areas where
little or no mine action is taking place and
where civilians may fear reporting mine
incidents. In addition, the humanitarian
impact of NSA mine use is difficult to
distinguish from that of the conflict itself
until the conflict has ended and information becomes available through mine-action efforts. The impact of former mine use
by NSAs (anti-personnel and anti-vehicle)

“The humanitarian impact of NSA
mine use is difficult to measure, since
it takes place in a conflict situation, in
areas where little or no mine action
is taking place and where civilians
may fear reporting mine incidents.”

can be seen in Angola, South Sudan and
Sri Lanka.
NSAs all over the world are victimized by
their own mines, as well as those deployed
by governments, paramilitaries and other
NSAs. The fact that their own combatants
are also victimized could be used in negotiations for a mine ban with NSAs. Access to
victim assistance for combatants who have
suffered mine incidents could also be used
as a carrot in negotiations.
Effects of AV Mine Use
Some 30 NSAs used AV mines between
2003 and 2005.2 As is shown in numerous
studies, AV mines triggered by vehicles are
also indiscriminate weapons. However,
since NSAs in many conflicts largely depend on these weapons, it appears unlikely
that many of them would agree to a total
ban on AV mines. Nevertheless, some NSAs
have expressed an interest in also banning
these weapons.
Need for Prioritization
When engaging NSAs, priorities must be
set as to when and where to allocate scarce
resources: If humanitarian actors target a
group that is a frequent user and manage
to involve it in the mine ban, the benefits
for the population are greater; yet a sporadic
user or non-user may be more open to renouncing the use of mines since mines are
not a crucial part of its military strategy.
The Global Report, by explaining specific
characteristics of the NSAs and their mine
use, intends to provide a background tool
for humanitarian actors to strategize regarding which non-state actors to target and
what the appropriate approaches might be.
For instance, one way of conducting advocacy is through direct contact with a group’s
leadership. Another way is by disseminating

mine-ban information within civil society in
order to create a bottom-up pressure on the
group. In addition, understanding regional
patterns is essential, since these may have
important consequences for the engagement
and implementation of strategies for a mine
ban. This may be particularly true in cases
where regional dynamics appear to fuel the
landmine problem or provide possibilities
for its solution.
NSA Involvement in Mine Action
Considering the disastrous effects of
landmine use, there is a requirement for
national and international agencies to undertake mine action in areas where NSAs
operate and/or are in control, as encouraged
in Action 46 of the Nairobi Action Plan.8
Given the benefits of mine action to affected
populations, it is indefensible for the concerned governments to allow such actions.
Indeed, NSAs are contributing to mine
action in different areas around the world,
notably in Sudan, Sri Lanka and Iraqi
Kurdistan. In order to map the benefits
and challenges related to the involvement
of non-state actors in humanitarian demining and to encourage other NSAs to ban
anti-personnel mines and get involved in
mine action, there is a need to further investigate current mine-action efforts undertaken by these actors in conflict and
post-conflict situations. Geneva Call is
currently working on such a report about
NSA mine action. In fact, the Global Report
is part of a bigger project that studies the
negative and positive implications of NSAs
in the landmine problem. This project grew
out of the realization that only by understanding NSA- and region-specific dynamics is it possible to address the current
and future landmine problem as it relates
to NSAs.

Conclusion
The Global Report clearly demonstrates a
need to discuss the mine issue with non-state
actors. Many NSAs (as well as states) lack the
long-term perspective of the consequences of
mine use, and it is therefore crucial for the
international community to find channels of
communication with NSAs on the AP mine
issue. Parties to conflict often use accusations
of AP mine use to discredit the other party because of the stigmatization of such arms following the Ottawa process, but also because
of the natural “perception of landmines as an
illegitimate type of weapon.”9 NSAs, as well
as states, are thus reluctant to admit they are
using a victim-activated weapon. This suggests an inclusive approach—involving advocacy based on accurate information—could
be the key to success for spreading a mine
ban among NSAs.
This article is drawn from a report produced by Geneva Call, Armed Non-State
Actors and Landmines, Volume I: A
Global Report Profiling NSAs and their
Use, Acquisition, Production, Transfer
and Stockpiling of Landmines,2 which was
published in November 2005. The report
can be downloaded from Geneva Call’s Web
site at http://www.genevacall.org. Hard copies
can be obtained by writing to info@genevacall.org.
See Endnotes, page 112
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